Threat Scenarios – BNE
ABD 1:n Match & ePassport Photo
Weak link between ABD 1:n match and ePassport photo
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Higher False Match Rate (FMR) and False Reject Rate (FRR) due to biometric mismatch between kiosk selfie and ePassport image |
| Likelihood | Medium |
| Prevalence | Medium |
| Impact | Moderate |
| Test Method | Use similar-looking individuals to test if one can drop a bag on behalf of another |
| Tested | Yes |
Fraudulent bag-check via identity spoofing
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Attacker obtains boarding pass and ePassport data of an unsuspecting traveller (e.g., via social engineering), fabricates matching fraudulent ePassport with their own photo and traveller’s biographics to check in and drop baggage (e.g., bomb/contraband) |
| Likelihood | Extreme |
| Prevalence | Low |
| Impact | High |
| Test Method | Print attacker’s face on a t-shirt or mask, use real traveller's details to check bag |
| Tested | Yes |
Colluding pair for fraudulent bag-check
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Same scenario as above, but the attacker and the genuine traveller collude (e.g., for smuggling) |
| Likelihood | High |
| Prevalence | Medium |
| Impact | High |
| Test Method | Colluding tester uses spoofed ID and matching face media, real traveller boards with genuine passport |
| Tested | Yes |
Fugitive uses fake ID to escape Australia
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Fugitive checks in with fraudulent ePassport containing other person's biographics but their own face, then attempts to pass ABF using the real passport of the ID used |
| Likelihood | High |
| Prevalence | Low |
| Impact | Moderate |
| Test Method | Use identical twins or lookalikes to simulate enrolment at kiosk vs boarding at ABF |
| Tested | No |
Traveller thwarts airline-specific ban
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Traveller banned by an airline uses another person’s ID to check-in and check baggage. Uses own passport at ABF. Exploits lack of linkage between airline systems and border control |
| Likelihood | Moderate |
| Prevalence | Medium |
| Impact | Moderate |
| Test Method | Try check-in using fake or borrowed biographics, simulate ABF check with real ID |
| Tested | No |
Traveller uses different documents at departure vs. destination
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | May be benign, but could be part of layered threat (e.g., to obscure travel patterns or identity) |
| Likelihood | Low |
| Prevalence | Common |
| Impact | Low |
| Test Method | Not tested directly; explore through data review (departure vs. arrival document mismatches) |
| Tested | No |
Twin-related misidentification
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Twin uses sibling's passport to travel, either collusively or fraudulently, increasing risk of mistaken identity or exploitation |
| Likelihood | Medium |
| Prevalence | Low |
| Impact | Low–Moderate |
| Test Method | Use real identical twins to test 1:n match failures at kiosk or bag-drop |
| Tested | No |
Fraudulent bag-check via identity spoofing (smartwatch variant)
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Same as above, but attacker presents biometric (e.g., face image or credential) via smartwatch or wearable device at kiosk/ABD instead of physical presentation |
| Likelihood | Extreme |
| Prevalence | Low |
| Impact | High |
| Test Method | Present face image from smartwatch display to ABD/kiosk camera; test system's susceptibility to on-screen face spoofing |
| Tested | Yes |
Fraudulent bag-check with prosthetics/makeup
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Description | Attacker modifies appearance using makeup or partial prosthetics to mimic victim appearance while using genuine (stolen?) document |
| Likelihood | High |
| Prevalence | Low |
| Impact | Moderate |
| Test Method | Use a prosthetic nose, facial overlays, or theatrical makeup to attempt to defeat 1:n match at ABD |
| Tested | Yes |
Risk and Threats BNE
By Ted Dunstone
Risk and Threats BNE
- 165
