Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 25

Course Retrospective

Econ 51 | 19 | Price Discrimination

Designing mechanisms to reveal preferences

Econ 51 | 18 | More Fun with the Principal-Agent Model

How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 24

The Long Run

Econ 51 | 17 | The Principal-Agent Model

How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 23

Public Goods and Common Resources

Mamdami, Trump, and Milton Friedman

Welfare Analysis of Equilibrium

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 22

Econ 51 | 16 | Uncertainty and Risk

Uncertainty and Risk Aversion

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 21

Bringing supply and demand together

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 20

Welfare Analysis of Equilibrium

Econ 51 | 15 | Signaling and Lemons

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Models

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 19

Bringing supply and demand together

Econ 51 | 14 | Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Models

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 18

Output Supply and Labor Demand for a Competitive Firm

Econ 51 | 13 | Static Games of Incomplete Information

Bayes Nash Equilibrium and Auctions

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 17

Profit Maximization, With and Without Market Power

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 16

Production and Cost for a Firm

Econ 50 | Fall 25 | Lecture 15

Production and Cost for a Firm

Econ 51 | 12 | Repeated Games

Sequential Games of Complete and Perfect Information